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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1891, Baron Maurice de Hirsch founded the Jewish Colonization Association (J.C.A.), through which he would manage a gigantic social welfare project consisting in the immigration of thousands of people from the Russian Empire towards Argentina, and their settlement in agricultural colonies.
In a previous paper 1 we have introduced this project as an example of philanthropy not oriented to charity, since immigrants had the right to accede to ownership of the land, not for free, but after having paid for it; the same occurred with all loans in kind received during their journey, and up to the first crops, and even the pertinent interest on them.
The economic rehabilitation of beneficiaries would be a common characteristic of each and every one of Hirsch's philanthropic undertakings. This distinctive aspect would take him, during a first stage, to finance significant educational projects in the countries of residence; however, after the pogroms of 1881/82 he considered that this strategy lacked chances of success, and that the only viable alternative would be organized emigration and settlement in new countries; with this purpose he created the J.C.A. in 1891. Even though USA was the preferred destination of spontaneous emigration, it was not the appropriate destination for a project entailing organized immigration in the magnitude imagined by Hirsch, and having to seek other destinations he decided in favor of Argentina.
In this paper, we will focus on the result of the project, which is usually qualified as a failure by historians. We will hold an alternative hypothesis, wholly opposed to this conclusion: if the social evaluation of the project were carried out, taking into account the externality it generated, the conclusion would be that the project was highly successful; even though its private evaluation, which implicitly is the usually made evaluation, would lead to the conclusion that it was a total failure.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section will include the antecedents of the project, describing the situation of Jews in the Russian Empire during the 19 th century and why Hirsch would opt for Argentina as the host country for immigrants. In section III we will introduce the private and social evaluation of the project, and the next section will include a detailed analysis of the externality in information generated by the project.
Finally, section V reports the main conclusions.
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE PROJECT 2
We will devote the first part of this section to describe the deteriorating situation of Jews in the Russian Empire during the 19 th century, whose extremely poor living conditions would lead to the intervention of Baron de Hirsch.
During the Middle Ages, some Jews had migrated to the lands situated to the north of the Black Sea due to the oppression they suffered under the Byzantine Empire. When in the 15 th century this area became a part of the Russian Empire, the Jews, although they were not particularly discriminated against and were few in number, were restricted from living outside this region. By late 18 th century Poland was partitioned and its largest portion was annexed to the Russian Empire; in this way, nearly 3,000,000 Jews in Poland, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia came to be under the rule of the Czar. These regions would in turn become the so-called Pale of Settlement, where the Jews were legally obliged to live since April 1835; the center of Russia, including Saint Petersburg and Moscow became prohibited territory, except under special residence permits granted to certain artisans and members of the bourgeoisie.
While ruled by Alexander I (1801-1825) the Jews' living conditions improved considerably, but his brother and successor, Nicholas I (1825-1855) implemented clearly anti-Semitic policies, enacting discriminatory laws even though his own ministers opposed them, on the grounds of the economic damage the regulations would bring about. In 1835 the Czar planned to transfer thousands of Jews to Siberia, but while they were on their way he issued a decree creating the Pale of Settlement, and redirected them there. He also expelled the Jews from the area making up the western frontier of Russia, at the same time ordering their recruitment into the army (cantonalism, which meant 25 years of service), although Jews continued being required the payments they were usually obliged to make in order to be granted exemption. remain there, and rural residents were forced to move to the former. The territory where they could legally reside was reduced by 90%.
The Jewish population was frightened by violence and by the new restrictions and started seeking the way to come out of the Russian Empire. Thousands of people started on their way towards the borders; emigration, which had mildly begun in the second half of the 70's gathered strength again. Upon crossing the western border they were in Brody, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where their living conditions were not much better; thus, they began a steady process of spontaneous emigration towards the USA, where the Jewish population would double within 10 years.
When in 1888 the Czar intensified restrictions, provincial authorities reduced even more the territory open to settlements, since small villages and towns were redefined as rural areas and consequently, prohibited for Jews; those who had moved to these regions after the decrees of 1882 were again forced to emigrate.
On the other hand, there were other strong restrictions such as the numerus clausus established in 1887, setting an admission quota for high schools and superior schools (for example, in the Pale of Settlement schools accepted 10% of Jews, while outside this area, the ratio decreased to 5%, and in Moscow and Saint Petersburg it was 3%), and special limitations imposed in 1889 for admission of Jewish lawyers to the bar.
In 1891, those Jews who still resided in Moscow and Saint Petersburg were suddenly forced to sell the properties where they had lived for generations, and to abandon the cities. Upon their arrival, they learnt that the lands they had acquired were not available.
While the long journey was taking place, the price of the land had more than doubled, thus it was not convenient for Hernández to deliver the lands on which a deposit had been paid, Upon arriving at Paris, Loewenthal submitted a written project to Great Rabbi ZadocKahn for the agricultural colonization of Jewish families in the Argentine Republic, which had to benefit Palacios' settlers first; this project held that help to persecuted Jews should not have the character of a gift, and that it would be most constructive to offer them the possibility of devoting themselves to agricultural work, to this effect founding agricultural colonies. 7 The project suggests the constitution of a Colonizing Association and details the area to be allocated by family group, the quantity of implements, form of capitalization, reimbursements, etc. The proposal states that each family be delivered a farm, from 50 to 100 hectares in size, and it indicates that with US$ 200,000 it would be feasible to an nually colonize no less than 100 families, around 1,000 people in all. Loewenthal considers that it would be ideal to have US$ 10,000,000 to be able to colonize 5,000 families in the short term, and he knows that two years ago Baron de Hirsch had tried to invest precisely that amount in the creation of technical and agricultural schools in the Pale of Settlement, this is why Loewenthal thinks of him for financing purposes.
Hirsch learnt of the project through the A.I.U. and gave his approval in January 1890;
then he decided to start a vast enterprise devoted to found large colonies in Argentina. As a first step in that direction, he sent a commission formed by Loewenthal and two experts in emigration and colonization issues, C.N. Cullen, a British engineer, and Colonel
Vanvinckeroy, of Belgian ancestors, to study the soil and other aspects that might condition the success of the project. In the minute of the meeting, held in Paris in August 1890, through which the commission was created, Hirsch advanced the general outline of the undertaking, which would be of philanthropic nature solely at the beginning, because it would not be successful if it were not organized and conducted as a business in which the invested capital should yield renewable profit or benefit; notwithstanding the fact that profit were exclusively devoted to developing the work, with a view to expanding it in favor of the largest possible number of emigrants. 8 In March 1891, the Commission sent Hirsch a favorable evaluation, and the approval of the Argentine government was also obtained.
Argentina was considered a country fit for the colonization project due to its extension, low population, climate, fertility, easily cultivable soils, even for the less experienced settlers, liberal political regime and the advantages offered by the legislation of the country to immigrants interested in farm work.
Mass emigration such as it was proposed would require the selection of immigrants, their transportation towards Argentina, and the opening of administrative offices in the place of destination so as to receive them and locate them in their new homes. The magnitude of the undertaking would make the J.C.A. the major philanthropic trust of its time, pursuant to the British Encyclopedia. It is therefore reasonable to ask ourselves if such a significant investment was justifiable in terms of the proposed objective.
In order to answer this question we will divide our objective into two: (a) To facilitate mass emigration of Russian Jews towards Argentina, and (b) To achieve their rehabilitation in the agricultural colonies. In this paper, we will focus our attention on the first objective, and the second one will be dealt with in a subsequent paper.
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The original J.C.A. project implied the transfer of 25,000 Russian Jews to Argentina during 1892, the first year of the project's existence, and 3,250,000 Jews were expected to emigrate to the colonies founded by J. C.A. in the course of 25 years (Winsberg, 1964) .
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To this end, in 1891 Hirsch placed US$ 10,000,000 at J.C.A. disposal and bequeathed the association most of his assets, consisting in the vast amount of US$ 36,500,000, which would be inherited by the organization after his dead which occurred on April 21, 1896 (H.
Avni, 1893).
As time went by, the plots of land acquired by the J.C.A. would reach 620,000
hectares, located in the provinces of Buenos Aires, La Pampa, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos and Santiago del Estero. Moisesville, the largest settlement, would have 118,000 hectares.
On the other hand, the expenses needed to organize the enterprise and to support the colonists up to the first crops would originally represent a much more significant percentage in J.C.A. budget than the investment in lands, even in the central regions of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe, due to the low price of land after the 1890 crisis (J. Mendelson, 1939) .
However, in fact, only 2,500 immigrants, one tenth of the projected number, were relocated during the first year; furthermore, during the first decade, the J.C.A. would only transfer 10,000 immigrants and although the Argentine Republic was the main destination of the project, colonies in the country never had more than 27,500 inhabitants, 14 making up 11 There exists abundant literature focussing interest on the eventual failure of the agricultural colonization, due to abandonment of farms by settlers, and fundamentally, by their descendants. For example, Haim Avni (1983) makes an interesting analysis of the subject.
12 M. Winsberg quotes S. Dubnow, 1918, volume II, p. 419. 13 It is possible that these figures were used in order to allow 
B. Social Evaluation
Nevertheless, if we take into account the externality generated by the project, its social evaluation might lead us to the opposite conclusion. But, what would the externality be? As we understand it, the externality is reflected in the number of immigrants who came to Argentina independently of the J.C.A., but who would have never done so had it not been on account of Baron de Hirsch's project. This section will be devoted to illustrating the origin of the externality. As E. Sofer (1982) points out, 16 "The emigration of Jews from Russia increased remarkably in the seventies and became widespread in the eighties of the nineteenth century. That until then the emigration movement was but slight is evidenced by the fact that between the years 1821-70 only 7,550 Jewish emigrants from Russia and Russian Poland set out for USA, at that time the most important objective point, and in the decade 1871-80 no less than 41,057 came from Russia alone. The direct cause which led to the largely increased emigration may be found in the anti-Jewish riots which occurred in the early eighties. Maddened by fear after these riots, the Jewish population, including not a few professional men, formed regular emigrant companies. These removed to Germany, Austro-Hungary, England, France, USA, and Palestine. There are no exact figures at hand to show the extent of that first emigration movement. The emigration from Russia to USA, which amounted, on the average, to no more than 4,100 persons a year even in the decade 1871-1880, reached Elkin, 1998, p. 119) .
21 S. Kibrick, 1978, pags.16-17. This fact also fostered immigration, since the news arriving at the communities of origin about the immigrants leaving the colonies towards the nearby cities, and essentially, towards Buenos Aires, constitute another significant variable at the time of understanding the externality in information generated by the project. The magnitude of this phenomenon is pointed out, for instance, by E. Sofer (1982) : and that today, a century afterwards, it is possible to find on the J.C.A. web page a similar assertion:
"The colonists attracted to the country a host of other Jewish immigrants who laid the foundation for the Argentine Jewish community."

26
In the next section, we will analyze in greater detail the externality in information generated by Baron de Hirsch's project.
IV. THE EXTERNALITY IN INFORMATION
According to David Schers (1992) , in a schematic view, the Jewish immigration may be seen as the result of factors of rejection in their country o f origin (push effect) and factors of attraction in the host or destination country (p ull effect). In these terms, the push effect would be represented by the pogroms and the economic situation in Czarist Russia.
As regards the pull effect, Schers points out that, besides the image of a tolerant country with economic possibilities, Argentina had the attraction offered by the government attitude to foster European immigration.
25 E. Adler, 1905, p. 236. 26 ICA in Israel, JCA Charitable Foundation.
However, even if during the 80's it is possible to identify both effects, then Jewish immigration was practically null. Only from 1891 onwards does mass immigration start.
Thus, the factors characterizing the pull effect may be interpreted as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, to have brought about Jewish immigration into Argentina. The externality in information we propose could be identified as the sufficient condition, which allowed for such a strong pull effect from 1891 on. In order to further this hypothesis, we will compare the information received by the Eastern European Jewry d uring the 80's and from 1891 on.
A. The Externality in Information During the 80's
Before 1891, in the Jewish European press there practically did not exis t comments on Argentina, and the few reports discouraged any plan of spontaneous immigration. So as to illustrate this fact, we will present several examples focussed on the second half of the 80's.
i During the 80's, Argentine consuls were occasionally active in places w ith considerable Jewish population, promoting emigration to the country without discrimination based on religious beliefs. However, the impact among Jews was minimum, because they did not rely o n the statements and explanations given by the consuls concerning Argentine laws and conditions (see section II). That was the case of a young Jewish locksmith apprentice in Warsaw who in 1888 decided to consult the management of the influential newspaper Hazefirá, about the truth of descriptions given by the Argentine consul:
27 L. Schallman, 1971, p. 9. 28 Jewish Chronicle, headquartered in London, was the community newspaper having more influence at the time; it has been published since 1841.
29 V. Mirelman, 1988, p.28. 30 Hazefirá, Warsaw's Hebrew newspaper. into Argentina were present, the sufficient condition was not verified, since the information about Argentina to which potential immigrants had access was scarce, and it did not support immigration but, on the contrary, was against any initiative of this kind.
B. The Externality in Information from 1891 Onwards
However, the outlook would be different from 1891 onwards. In this paper we have focussed our interest on the result of this project, which is generally termed a failure by historians of the subject. We have proposed an alternative hypothesis: were the project evaluated on a social basis, taking into account the externality generated by same, it could be concluded that the project was highly successful, even though its private evaluation concludes in a clear failure.
43 ICA in Israel, JCA Charitable Foundation.
J.C.A.'s original project consisted in transferring to Argentina 25,000 Russian Jews during 1892, the first year of the Association's existence, and in the course of 25 years 3,250,000 Jews were expected to emigrate to the colonies founded by the J.C.A. However, during the first year only 2,500 immigrants were re-located and even if Argentina was the main destination of the project, the colonies in Argentina never had more than 33,000
inhabitants. In these terms, the private evaluation is clearly negative; if we consider that the objective was to maximize the number of Russian Jews having access to the possibility of reaching a life of dignity through their immigration into Argentina, the ratio between the investment made out by J. C.A. and the number of beneficiaries is obviously inadequate.
Nevertheless, taking into account the externality generated by the project, its social evaluation might enable us to reach the opposite conclusion. The externality is reflected in the number of immigrants who arrived in the country independently of the J.C.A., but who would never have done it had Baron de Hirsch project not existed.
The project put Argentina on the map of Eastern European Jewry, in a world in which the dissemination of information was slow and deficient. Information about the country started to flow fast due to actions by the J.C.A. committees and the informal channels they generated: rumors on Baron de Hirsch plan spread all over Eastern Europe. This fact encouraged spontaneous immigration by those who would have never left Europe had they not counted on this information. On the other hand, colonists encouraged the immigration of relatives, friends and neighbours; firstly through their exchanging letters with Europe, and above all, through the reports of some of them, correspondents of the main newspapers of the Eastern European Jewish press, which followed the development of the project with great interest. If we add to this the news about the immigrants who left the colonies towards the nearby to wns, and essentially to Buenos Aires, it is possible to state that the project of the J.C.A. generated a significant externality in information, by v irtu e of which many other immigrants came to the country to became the roots of the Argentine Jewish Community.
